Critical currents -referred to by some as post-structuralism and by others as Neo-Nietzscheanism, but more generally subsumed under the heading of postmodernism- continue to exert a significant influence within the social sciences. Even today, we persist in problematizing such phenomena as truth, culture, objectivity, and human nature. In this context, postmodern “currents,” which approach truth and human nature through a lens of contemporary skepticism, offer a remarkably rich repertoire, ranging from epistemological nihilism to anarchist imaginaries. Todd May, as part of this repertoire, argues that human rights cannot be wholly reduced to absurdity, and that objectivity and culture are not necessarily in contradiction. We present to your attention the interview conducted by Ulaş Bager Aldemir with Todd May on the themes of the human, truth, and culture.
Ulaş Bager Aldemir: The French thinker Michel Foucault once stated: “Man is a recent invention, and one perhaps nearing its end.” Taking this observation by Foucault as a point of departure, I would like to discuss the concept of the Human. In a philosophical–anthropological context, what is the Human? Is it a natural reality, a historical and social construct, or an empty concept?
Todd May: When Foucault discusses the concept of “Man,” he doesn’t ask what it means. Rather, he’s interested in the role it plays in our discourse. (Later, he expands his analyses from discourses to practices.) I suspect he would do the same thing with the concept of the human. After all, the idea of the human has, over the course of history, been used to differentiate us from our fellow creatures, placing us above them in one way or another. It’s not an empty concept, but one with shifting meanings, depending on the way in which we try to differentiate ourselves from other animals. Rationality, language, memory, general intelligence, and so on have been ways to define the human so that we aren’t like other living beings with which we share the planet. Of course, one could define the human in purely genetic or species terms, but that isn’t the role that it has played through much of our history.
Ulaş Bager Aldemir: In the context of these philosophical–anthropological debates concerning the Human, could you also share your views on Human Dignity and Human Rights?
Todd May: I think dignity is an important concept, one that could be applied to other animals in addition to humans (defined here in species terms). What would that term mean, and how is it used? I would take the idea of dignity to be closely tied to that of respect. That is, dignity is something to be respected in other creatures; to have dignity is to be respect-worthy. But that raises the question of what makes something worthy of respect, that is, possessing dignity? I think it can be different for different creatures, depending on their characteristics. For creatures like us, it would be tied to things like having a life to lead that involves–in addition to having basic needs like food, shelter, etc. met–having access to social interaction, having choices about how to live, and so on. If we see things that way, then the concept of rights follows from that. Rights are the entitlements we have to those things that allow us to lead dignified lives, that is, lives that are respected in their vital characteristics.
Ulaş Bager Aldemir: Professor May, as you would surely agree, it is hardly possible to deny the relationship between Philosophy and Culture. Does the fact that Philosophy itself is a cultural reality undermine its claim to objectivity? Or, as with the question we ask about the Human, is philosophy a historical fiction, or does it have a form of reciprocity with certain realities?
Todd May: This is a complicated question, and I can only offer a general response to it. To say that a practice like philosophy is a cultural one does not necessarily undermine its objectivity. What would objectivity be other than being responsive to reasons? And what would those reasons be other than being responsive to other reasons? If we look at things this way, then we can see that, although reasons are part of culture, they can be objective. It’s important to recognize that we should hold our beliefs–moral, scientific, and otherwise–to be fallible. To hold beliefs as fallible is not to say they’re false or fictional. Rather, it’s to say that they are open to revision if successfully challenged. That challenge may come from a number of different directions. We may hold a belief that, in the face of new evidence, appears to be false. Or we may hold a belief that, in the spirit of Foucault’s analyses, has intolerable consequences. Philosophy, as an epistemic practice (or group of epistemic practices) is no different in this way from other epistemic practices, and other practices more broadly. It can be objective in the sense that it is reason-responsive. That is, philosophy is an epistemic practice that responds to available reasons and is open to other reasons that may challenge its views (or the views of some of its proponents) from a number of different angles. It is, in short, a fallible epistemic practice.
Ulaş Bager Aldemir: As part of the question of culture, how do you, as a philosopher, evaluate the relationship between Eastern and Western civilizations?
Todd May: Honestly, I don’t do such a thing. The concept of Eastern civilization as a whole or Western civilization as a whole are too broad. How, for instance, would we compare the civilization of China with that of Indonesia or the Maori of New Zealand? On the other side, how is U.S. civilization comparable with that of Chile or the First Nations of Canada? When folks speak of the West, do they mean it geographically or in terms of industrial development? If they mean the former, then what is the connection to “civilization”? And if the latter, is Japan an industrialized country? China? Coming back to Foucault, I think the distinction one tries to draw between East and West has less to do with real differences and more to do with the effects of thinking in terms of a strict binary distinction, for example fostering an unhelpful romantic Orientalism (which, by the way, Foucault himself was guilty of at moments).
